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- 1  -Summary 
"Additionality" has  been  a  major  problem  in the  implementation  of the 
Community's  Regional  Policy because  of  the doubts,  expressed both  by 
the  European  Parliament  and  the  Court  of  Auditors,  concerning  the 
real  link  between  the provision  of  Community  resources  for  regional 
development  and  the  implementation  of  projects  beyond  and  in addition 
to those projects  which  would  have  been  undertaken  by  Member  States 
without  such  Community  resources.  Thus,  although  there  can  be  no 
question that  the  ERDF  has  contributed  to  some  financial  flows  from 
the wealthier to the poorer  Member  States, it is not  yet  evident  that 
these  resources  have  in  fact  been  used  to  promote  the  development  of 
less-favoured  regions. 
This  study  reviews  the application of  the principle of additionality 
in  regard  to  the  ERDF  by  those  Member  States  who  have  been  major 
beneficiaries  from  the  Fund.  (Spain  and  Portugal  are  not  included 
because  their  recent  accession  to  the  Community  does  not  allow  for 
sufficient  experience  to  have  been  gained  in  their use  of  ERDF 
funds.)  It  also  examines  the  problems  associated  with  defining 
"additionality" and  presents  some  conclusions  and  suggestions  for 
improving  Community  policies  in  this  area. 
The  document  exists  only  in  English.  However,  the  Secretariat  will 
try to satisfy,  if possible,  the  requests  of  Members  who  may  wish  to 
receive  a  translation into other  Community  languages  of the whole  or 
a  part  of  the text. 
- 2  -Zusammenfassung. 
Das  Problem  der  "Zusitzlichkeit" spielte eine  wichtige  Rolle  bei  der  Ver-
.wirklichung der  Regionalpolitik  der  Gemeinschaft,  da  sowohl  das  Europiische 
Parlament  als auch  der  Rechnungshof  Zweifel  geiuAert  haben,  was  die tatsichliche 
Beziehung  zwischen  der  Bereitstellung von  Gemeinschaftsmitteln  fur  die  Regio-
nalentwicklung  und  der  Durchfuhrung  von  Vorhaben  uber  die  Vorhaben  hinaus betrifft, 
die  von  den  Mitgliedstaaten durchgefuhrt  worden  wiren,  wenn  die  Gemeinschaft 
keine entsprechenden  Mittel  bereitgestellt hitte.  Obwohl  es  keine  Frage  ist, 
daA  der  EFRE  zu  einem  gewissen  FluA  von  Finanzmitteln  aus  den  wohlhabenderen 
in die  irmeren  Mitgliedstaaten beigetragen hat,  so  wird  doch  nicht  auf  jeden 
Fall  deutlich,  daA  diese  Mittel  in der  Praxis  auch  zur  Forderung  der  Entwick-
lung  der  weniger  begunstigten  Regionen  verwendet  wurden. 
In  dieser Studie  wird  die  Anwendung  des  Grundsatzes  der  "Zusitzlichkeit" unter-
sucht;  dabei  wird  vor  allem  auf  die  aus  dem  EFRE  geforderten  Mitgliedstaaten 
eingegangen  werden,  die die  greAten  Zuschusse  aus  dem  Fonds  erhalten haben. 
<Auf  Spanien  und  Portugal  wird  nicht  eingegangen,  da  sie erst  vor  kurzer  Zeit 
der  Gemeinschaft  beigetreten sind  und  noch  keine  ausreichenden  Erfahrungen 
daruber  vorliegen,  wie  die  EFRE-Mittel  in diesen  Lindern  verwendet  wurden). 
Ferner  werden  die  Probleme  im  Zusammenhang  mit  der  Definition der  "Zusitz-
lichkeit" gepruft;  auAerdem  enthilt  das  Dokument  bestimmte  BeschluAfolgerungen 
und  Anregungen  zur  Verbesserung  der  Gemeinschaftspolitik  in diesem  Bereich. 
Das  Dokument  ist nur  in  englischer  Sprache  verfugbar.  Das  Sekretariat  wird 
sich  jedoch  darum  bemuhen,  der  Bitte von  Mitgliedern,  die moglicherweise  eine 
Obersetzung  des  gesamten  Textes  bzw.  eines  Teils  des  Textes  in  andere  Gemein-
schaftssprachen  wunschen,  zu  entsprechen. 
- 2a  -La  ''complimentariti"  constitue  un  problime  majeur  de  La  mise  en  oeuvre 
de  la potitique  regionale  de  La  Communauti  en  raison  des  doutes  exprimis a La 
fois  par  le Parlement  europeen  et par  La  Cour  des  comptes  au  sujet  du  lien 
reel existant entre  la mise  a disposition de  ressources  communautaires  pour 
Le  developpement  rigional  et  La  realisation de  projets depassant  ou  comple-
tant  les projets qui  auraient  ete entrepris  par  les  Etats  membres  sans  les 
ressources  de  La  Communaute.  S'il n'est  pas  douteux  que  le  FEDER  a  contribue 
a certains transferts financiers  des  Etats  membres  prospires  vers  les  Etats 
membres  pauvres,  il n'est pas  encore  evident  que  ces  ressources  aient  effec-
tivement  ete utilisees pour  promouvoir  le developpement  des  regions  defavo-
risees. 
La  presente etude  a  trait a l'application du  principe de  La  complemen-
tariti, en  ce  qui  concerne  le  FEDER,  par  les  Etats  membres  qui  ont  ete  les 
grands  beneficiaires de  ce  fonds  <elle  n'englobe  pas  l'Espagne  et  le  Portu-
gal  parce  que  l'adhesion  recente de  ces  pays  a La  Communaute  n'a pas  permis 
d'acquirir  une  experience  suffisante de  l'utilisation des  ressources  du 
FEDER  en  ce  qui  les  concerne).  Sont  aussi  examines  les  problimes  que  pose  La 
definition de  La  complementarite.  Enfin,  l'etude presente  des  conclusions  et 
suggestions  visant a ameliorer  les politiques de  La  Communaute  dans  ce 
domaine. 
Le  document  n'existe qu'en  anglais.  Toutefois,  le  secretariat s'ef-
forcera  de  satisfaire, dans  La  mesure  du  possible,  les  demandes  des  deputes 
qui  souhaiteraient obtenir  une  traduction de  l'ensemble  ou  d'une  partie du 
texte dans  d'autres  langues  de  La  Communaute. 
- 2b  -Resum~ 
.Begrebet  supplering  bar  VGeret  et  stort  problem  i  forbindelse  med 
gennemf0relsen  af  EFs  regionalpolitik  pa  grund  af  den  bade  af 
Europa-Parlamentet  og  Revisionsretten  udtrykte  tvivl  om  den  reelle  forbindelse 
mellem  ydelsen  af  EF-midler  til  regionaludvikling  og  gennemf0relsen  af 
projekter  ud  over  og  som  supplement  til  projekter,  der  ville  VGere  blevet 
gennemf0rt  af  medlems stat  erne  uden  sad  anne  EF-midler.  Se lv  om  det  er  ba!Vet 
over  enbver  tvivl,  at  EFRU  bar  bidraget  til en  vis  overf0rsel  af midler fra  de 
rigere  til de  fattigere  medlemsstater,  er  det  saledes  endnu  ikke  tydeligt,  at 
disse  midler  i  virkeligbeden  er  blevet  anvendt  til  at  fremme  udviklingen  af 
ugunstigt stillede regioner. 
I  unders0gelsen  g0res  der  rede  for,  bvorledes  suppleringsprincippet  i 
forbindelse  med  EFRU  er  blevet  anvendt  af  medlemsstater,  der  bar  modtaget 
store  midler  fra  fond en;  (Spanien  og  Portuga  1  er  ikke  medtaget,  fordi  deres 
nylige  tiltr~else af  EF  ikke  bar  gjort  det  muligt  at  indsamle  tilstr~kelige 
erfaringer  med  deres  anvendelse  af  EFRU-midler).  Lige ledes  unders0ges 
problemerne  med  at  definere  begrebet  supplering,  og  der  frems~ttes  nogle 
konklusioner  og  forslag til forbedring  af  EFs  politik pa  dette omrade. 
Dokumentet  foreligger  kun  pa  engelsk.  Men  sekretariatet vil  efter  evne  fors0ge 
at  im0dekomme  anmodninger  fra  medlenmer,  der  matte  0nske  en  overs~ttelse  til 
andre  f~llesskabssprog af hele dokumentet eller en del  beraf. 
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11  anETEAEOE  OfliJOVTIKO  npo~AfliJO  OTflV  EcpOpiJOY~  Tfl~  KOIVOTIK~~ 
nEp I  £PEPE I  OK~~ not. IT I  K~~  AOYUl  TUlV  01-Jcp I  ~OA  I  c.Sv  nou  E~Ecppaaav TOOO  TO  Eupwna'IK6 
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y~~ TUlV  npoypOIJIJOTUlV  ntpav  KOI  Enf  nAEOV  TUlV  npoypOIJIJOTUlV  EKElVUlV  nou  8a  OVE-
AO~~OVQV To  KpaT~ IJEAfl  xwpi~ Tou~  KotvoTIKou~ auTou~ n6pou~.  'ETcrt  t..o1n6v, 
OV  KOI  ava~cpf~OAQ TO  ETnA  OUVE~OAE OT~  po~ OpiOIJEVUlV  nopwv  an6  TO  OIKOVOIJIKc.5~ 
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IJE  TO  ETnA  an6  Ta  KpaT~  IJEA~  nou  nEptcra6TEpo  EuEpyET~8flKav an6  To  TaiJEfo.  (H 
Icrnavia  KQI  '1  nopToyat..fa  OEV  nEpiAOIJ~OVOVTOI  OEOOIJEVOU  OTI  ~  np6acpaT~  EVTQ~~ 
Tou~ OTflV  KoiVOTflTO  OEV  ETIETPE~E va  anoKOIJIOBEf  EnapK~~ nEfpa  an6  T~v EK  IJEpou~ 
TOU~ XP~O~ TUlV  nopwv  TOU  ETnA).  E~ETO~EI  Enfa~~ Ta  OXETIKO  IJE  TOV  npoOOIOpiOIJO 
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To  Eyypacpo  unapxEI  IJOVO  OTQ  AyyAIKQ.  H rpOIJIJOTEfa  UlOTOOO  8a  npocrna8~0EI  va  IKO-
VOTIOI~OEI,  El  6uvaT6v,  Tl~ Tux6v  Ent8u1JfE~  ~out..EuTc.5v  va  t..a~ouv  IJETacppacr~  Tou 
OUVOAOU  ~  IJEPDU~  TOU  KEIIJEVOU  OE  OAAE~  KOIVOTIKE~  yt..c.5craE~. 
- 2d  -Sunto 
La 
11Cornplementarita
11  costituisce  un  problema  di  ri Lievo  nell'attuazione  della 
Politica  regionate  della  ComunitlJ,  dati  i  dubbi,  espressi  sia  dal  Parlamento 
europeo  che  dalla  Corte  dei  conti,  circa  il  legame  reale  esistente  tra  Le 
risorse  della  Comunita  stanziate  per  Lo  svi Luppo  regionale  e  L'attuazione  di 
:pr.ogetti  .che  superano  e  si  aggiungono  a  auei  progetti  che  sarebbero  stati 
avviati  dagli  Stati  membri  senza  tali  risorse  comunitarie.  Pertanto,  sebbene 
non  vi  si  a no  dubbi  auanto  a l  fatto  che  L  • FESR  abbi a  cont ri buito  ad  a Lcuni 
flussi  finanziari  dagli  Stati  membri  piu  ricchi  a  auelli  piu  poveri,  non  e 
ancora  evidente  che  tali  risorse  siano  state  effettivamente  utilizzate  per 
promuovere  lo sviluppo nelle  regioni  meno  favorite  • 
.l.l  p-resente  studio  passa  in  rassegna  L'applicazione  del  principia  di 
complementarita  con  riferimento  all'FESR  da  parte  di  auegli  Stati  membri  che 
sono  stati  i  principali  beneficiari  del  Fondo.  (Spagna  e  Portogallo  non  sono 
inclusi,  poiche  La  Loro  adesione  alla  ComunitlJ  e  troppo  recente  per  poter 
consentire  di  trarre  un'esperienza  sufficiente  auanto  al  loro  uso  degli 
stanziamenti  dell'FESR>.  Esso  esamina  altresi  i  problemi  Legati  alla 
definizione  di  "complementarita"  e  presenta  alcune  conclusioni  e  suggerimenti 
per migliorare  La  politica comunitaria  in auesto settore. 
Il  documento  esiste  soltanto  in  inglese.  Tuttavia,  il Segretariato  cerchera  di 
soddisfare,  nella  misura  del  possibile,  le  richieste  dei  deputati  che 
desiderino  ricevere  una  traduzione  in  altre  Lingue  comunitarie  del  testo 
integrate  o  di  parte di  esso. 
VS1/8047I 
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- 2e  -SAMENVATTING 
De  toepassing  van  het  "complementariteitsbeginsel"  in  het  regionale 
beleid van  de  Gemeenschap  blijkt  in de  praktijk heel  wat  problemen  op 
te  leveren:  zowel  het  Europese  Parlement  als de  Rekenkamer  hebben  er 
hun  twijfels over uitgesproken of  de  door  de  Gemeenschap  voor  regionale 
ontwikkeling uitgetrokken gelden  inderdaad worden  gebruikt  voor  de 
financiering  van  ande_re  proje.cten dan  die welke  ook  zonder  communautai re 
steun door  de  Lid-staten zouden  zijn opgezet.  Vast  staat  weliswaar  dat 
het  EFRO  heeft  bijgedragen tot overdracht  van  middelen  van  de  rijkere 
naa-r  de  armere  lid-staten maar  dat betekent  nog  niet dat  deze  gelden 
ook  inderdaad  voor  de  ontwikkeling  van  probleemgebieden  zijn gebruikt. 
De  studie handelt  over  de  toepassing  van  het  complementariteits-
beginsel  in de  lid-staten die het  meest  van  het  EFRO  hebben  geprofiteerd 
(Spanje  en  Portugal  komen  er  nog  niet  in  voor  omdat  in  deze  nieuwe  lid-
staten nog  niet  voldoende  ervaring met  het  EFRO  kon  worden  opgedaan). 
Voorts  wordt  ingegaan  op  de  precieze  inhoud  van  het  begrip  "complementari-
teit" en  worden  een  aantal  conclusies  getrokken  en  suggesties  aangedragen 
ter verbetering  van  het  beleid van  de  Gemeenschap  op  dit  terrein. 
Het  document  is alleen  in  het  Engels  beschikbaar.  De  gehele  of 
gedeeltelijke vertaling van  de  tekst  in een  andere  taal  van  de  Gemeenschap 
kan  worden  aangevraagd  bij  het  secretariaat, dat  zal  trachten  hieraan  een 
gunstig gevolg te geven. 
- 2f  -Resumen 
La  ··complementaridad"  ha  constituido  un  importante  problema  en  la ejecuci6n de 
la politica regional  comunitaria a  causa  de  las dudas,  expresadas  tanto  por el 
Parlamento  Europeo  como  por el Tribunal  de  Cuentas,  en  cuanto  a  la relaci6n 
real que existe entre el suministro  de  recursos  comunitarios  para el 
desarrollo  regional  y  la ejecuci6n de  proyectos  que  rebasen y  complementen  los 
que  habr!an emprendido  los Estados  miembros si no  hubiesen  dispuesto de  dichos 
recursos  comunitarios.  As!,  aunque  no  se  puede  dudar  de  que  el FEDER  haya 
contribuido al establecimiento de  algunos  flujos  financieros  de  los Estados 
miembros  m!s  ricos  a  los  m~s pobres,  no  es evidente  que  estos  recursos  se 
hayan empleado  de  hecho  en  fomentar  el desarrollo de  las  regiones  menos 
favorecidas~ 
Este estudio analiza la aplicac16n del  principia de  "complementaridad" 
respecto del FEDER  realizada  por  los Estados  miembros  que  han  sido  los 
principales  beneficiarios del Fondo  (no  se  ha  incluido a  Espana  ni  a  PortuJal 
pues  su reciente adhesi6n a  la Comunidad  no  ha  permitido adquirir  una 
experiencia suficiente del empleo  de  los  fondos  del  FEDER  hecho  por estos 
pa!ses).  El estudio examina  asimismo el problema  relacionado  con  la definici6n 
de  la "complementaridad"  y  presenta algunas  conclusiones  y  sugerencias  para 
mejorar las pol!ticas comunitarias  en este ambito. 
El  documento  existe solamente  en  ingl~s.  No  obstante,  la Secretar!a intentara, 
en la medida  de  sus  posibilidades,  satisfacer las  peticiones  de  los  diputados 
que  deseen disponer  de  una  traducci6n de  la totalidad  o  de  una  parte del  texto 
en otros  idiomas  comunitarios. 
- 2g  -PO 
Sumario 
A  "Complementaridade" e um  problema  importante  na  execu~~o da Polltica 
Regional Comuni taria devido  ·a.s  duvidas,  expressas  tanto pelo Parlamento 
Europeu  como  pelo Tribunal  de  Contas,  relativamente a  liga~ao existente entre 
o  fornecimento  dos  recursos  comunitarios  ao  desenvolvimento  regional  e  a 
execu~~o de  projectos  complementares  aos  projectos  que  teriam sido 
empreendidos  pelos Estados-membros  sem  esses  recursos  comunitarios~ Assim, 
embora  nao  haja  duvida  de  que  o  FEDER  contribuiu  para  alguns  fluxos 
financeiros  dos  Estados-membros  mais  ricos  para  os  mais  pobres,  n~o  ~'  no 
entanto~  evidente  que  esses  recursos  tenham  sido  efectivamente  usados  para 
promover  o  desenvolvimento  das  regi~es mais  desfavorecidas. 
Este  estudo  reve a  aplica~ao do  principia da  adicionalidade  relativamente  ao 
FEDER  por parte dos  Estados-membros  que  mais beneficiaram do  Fundo.  (Espanha  e 
Portugal  nao estao  inclu!dos  porque  a  sua  recente  adesao a Comunidade  n~o lhes 
permitiu a  aquisi~ao de  uma  experiencia suficiente na  sua  utiliza~~o dos 
fundos  do  FEDER~) Analisa ainda  os  problemas  associados a  defini~ao de 
ncomplementaridade"  e  apresenta algumas  conclus~es e  sugest~es relativamente 
ao melhoramento  das  pollticas comunitarias  neste domlnio. 
0  documento  apenas  existe  em  ingles.  No  entanto,  o  Secretariado  tentara 
satisfazer,  se  poss!vel,  os  pedidos  dos  Membros  que  desejarem  receber  uma 
tradu~ao para outras  llnguas  comunitarias  de  todo  o  texto ou  de  uma  parte. 
WG(VSA)4457P 
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- 3  -Preface 
The  principal  instrument  of  the  Community's  Regional  Policy is  the  European 
Regional  Development  Fund,  established  in  1975  with  the  strong  support  of  the 
European  Parliament.  Ever  since  the  entry  into force  of the first  regulation 
concerning the  fund  there  has  been  criticism of  the  nature  of  the  instrument 
created  by  this  regulation  and  of  the  extent  to  which  it can  genuinely  be 
~onsidered as  an  instrument  of  Community  Regional  Policy.  Subsequent 
amendments  to  the  regulations  have  not  sufficed to  remove  these  doubts  and  to 
,counter  successfully the  criticisms  levelled at  the  Fund,  especially by  the 
European  Parliament.  These  criticisms  have  concerned  above  all the question 
of additionality that  is  the  topic  of  this  paper. 
The  Directorate  General  for  Research  considers  it useful  to  submit  a  paper  on 
the problem  of  additionality as  an  aid  to  future  discussion.  The  document 
was  prepared  by  Mr  Anthony  Comfort  of  the  Division  for  Economic  Affairs, 
headed  by  Mr  Norbert  Lochner,  with  the  assistance  of  a  Robert  Schuman 
Scholar,  Mr  Peter  Wallace.  Miss  Helene  Drees  also  participated  in the 
preparatory work.  Any  opinions  and  recommendations  contained  in this  paper 
are  those  of  the  author.  They  are  not  necessarily  shared  or  approved  by  the 
Members  of  the  European  Parliament,  nor  by  the  Directorate  General  for 
Research  or  any  other  of  the  Parliament's  services. 
Michael  Palmer 
Director  General 
- 4  -Introduction 
1.  from  the date  of  establishment  of  the  European  Economic  Community  in  1957 
onwards,  convergence,  that  is "harmonious  development"  by  means  of  the 
reduction of  differences  in  levels  of  prosperity between  regions  of  the 
Community  and,  especially, of  the  backwardness  of  less-favoured  regions, 
has  been  a  primary objective  of  the  Community.  It ·should  be  noted  that 
this objective  was  not  described  in  the  Preamble  to  the  Treaty of  Rome  as 
a  reduction  of  differences  between  Member  States  but  between  regions  of 
~he Community  and  ~he European  Regional  Development  Fund  that  was 
eventually set  up  in  1975  specifically refers  to  correction of "the main 
regional  imbalances  in  the  Community".  It was  however  the  accession of 
new  Member  States  in 1973  with  severe  regional  problems  that, firstly, 
brought  tt>  -t·he  fore the need  to  reduce  the  serious  imbalances  by  means  of 
a  Regional  Development  Fund  and,  secondly,  gave  greatly increased 
importance  to this  field  of  Community  activity with  a  rising share  in  the 
Community's  budget. 
2.  ·The  Counc·i l  ·Regulation that established  the  ERDF  in  19751  referred  to the 
need  to "correct  the principal  regional  imbalances  resulting from 
agricultural  preponderance,  industrial  change  and  structural 
under-employment".  The  objective  was  slightly modified  in  the  new 
Council  Regulation  of  1984  on  the  ERDF2  which  stated that  the  purpose  of 
the  ERDF  was  "to  contribute to  the  correction of  the principal  regional 
imbalances  within  the  Community  through  participation  in  the  development 
and  structural  adjustment  of  regions  whose  development  is  lagging  behind 
and  in  the  conversion  of  declining  industrial  regions." 
3.  However,  it is  sometimes  alleged  that  a  major  objective of  the  Fund,  not 
specified  in the  regulations,  is the transfer of  resources  by  means  of 
the  Community  budget  to  Less  prosperous  Member  States  and,  even,  the 
partial  corre-ction  of  imbalances  between  Member  States arising  from  the 
unequal  burden  of  contributions  to  the  budget  and  the  unequal  benefits of 
expenditure under  other  Community  policies.  This  "objective" would  of 
course  have  no  relation  to  the  solution  of  regional  imbalances,  except 
1ncidentally, and  would  be  simply  an  expression of  national  interests as 
seen by  national  governments  represented  in  the  Council  of  Ministers  by 
1  Council  Regulation  No  724/75,  OJ  L 73  of  21.3.75 
2  Council  Regulation  No  1787/84,  OJ  L  169  of  28.6.84 
- 5  -their Ministers  of  Finance.  At  most  such  a  transfer  could  be  called 
"financial equalisation"  Cin  French  "perequation"),  as  is  practised  in 
some  federal  states,  but  it would  not  be  possible  to  describe  this as  an 
instrument  of  Regional  Policy  since  the  budgetary transfers  involved 
between  states  or  regions  are  not  tied  to  expenditure  on  particular 
policies. 
4.  In  consequence,  the  question  has  often  been  raised  as  to whether  ERDF 
3  assistance  has  really provided  "additional" or  even  "complementary" 
resources  for  the  development  of  the  less-favoured  regions.  It is 
alleged that  in  some  cases  funds  from  the  Community  simply  replace  what 
national  governments  would  have  been  obliged  to  spend  in  any  case  in 
support  of their  regional  policy  and  that,  far  from  contributing to the 
solution  of  regional  imbalances  in  the  Community,  the  ERDF  is  simply  an 
accounting  mechanism  whereby  the  national  budgets  of  some  Member  States 
are  compensated  for  past  or  existing  commitments  in  one  particular field 
of their expenditure,  which  happens  to  be  regional  policy.  This  is the 
so-called  problem  of  "additionality",  which  in  turn  lies at  the  heart  of 
the  debate  on  "convergence"  and  on  the  future  development  of  the 
Community.  As  such, it has  been  of  major  concern  to  the  European 
Parliament,  which  has  referred  to  the  problem  in  its  resolutions  on 
several  occasions  (see  below),  and  to  the  Court  of  Auditors. 
5.  In its  report  concerning  the  financial  year  1984,4  the  Court  of  Auditors 
addressed  this  issue  once  again.  It  found  in  particular that  almost  all 
projects for  which  applications  were  made  to  the  ERDF  had  started before 
a  decision  was  made  to grant  aid.  The  report  stated that: 
"It follows  •••  that  in  practice  there  is  no  direct  relationship 
between  the  execution  of  a  given  project  and  the  Commission's  aid 
decision.  Rather  it is the  terms  attached  to  the granting of 
national  aid  which  have  a  determining  impact.  It  should  be  borne  in 
mind,  however,  that  the  projects  that  best  satisfy the  objectives 
3  In  French  "complementarity"  is  seen  as  the .qualitative  counterpart  to a 
numerical  additionality,  i.e.  ERDF  spending  may  be  "complementary"  to 
national  spending  by  inducing  changes  in  the  nature  and  type  of  projects 
supported  even  if "additionality"  in  terms  of  extra  resources  remains 
unprovable 
4  OJ  C 326  of  16  December  1985.  The  Annual  Report  of  the  Court  of  Auditors 
for  1985  does  not  refer  to  the  issue 
- 6  -laid  down  by  the national  authorities  and  that  also  meet  the  ERDF's 
formal  eligibility criteria,  are  not  necessarily the  best  from  the 
Community's  point  of  view. 
There  is therefore  an  imperative  need  to  increase  the effectiveness 
of  the  Fund  as  an  instrument  of  the  Community  regional  policy by 
stressing the additional  nature  of  the  aid  granted  by  the  Community, 
both  at  global  level  and  at  the  level  of  individual  projects.  To 
this end,  the  Commission  should  take all the  necessary steps at  the 
level  of  its management  and  bring all its influence  to bear  on  the 
Member  States  in  order  to  achieve  genuine  additionality.  The  new 
Regulation  which  came  into force  in  1985  should  give  the  Commission 
the  opportunity to  exert  increasing  influence  on  the  Member  States' 
regional  policies  and  help  to attain the  Community's  objectives  more 
efficiently.  This  possibility does  exist,  as  shown  by  the 
differences  noted  between  the  dates  of  the  commencement  of  work  and 
the  dates  of  ERDF  aid being  granted." 
o.  Tne  apparently cavalier  attitude with  which  some  central  government 
agencies  treat  the  structural  funds  is  reinforced  in  times  of  budgetary 
stringency.  Current  pressures  to  reduce  the  resources  of  the  funds  to 
allow  commitments  under  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy to  be  fulfilled 
serve  to  strengthen  the  impression  that  regional  and  social  spending  are 
luxuries  which  can  be  dispensed  with  at  the  Community  level  since  they 
serve  no  essential  purpose. 
- Definition  of  additionality 
7.  Additionality  can  be  broadly  described  as  the  concept  of an  increase  in 
total spending  on  regional  policy  and  regional  infrastructure from  all 
sources  resulting  from  an  increase  in  the  resources  made  available for 
this  purpose  from  the  ERDF. 
8.  The  principle of  additionality of  EC  financing  requires  a  political 
~ommitment by  the Member  States to permit ·Ec  expenditure  which  is 
normally  deployed  in parallel to  national  programmes  to  supplement  rather 
than  substitute  national  expenditure.  This  means  that  projects  must  be 
funded  which  would  not  otherwise  go  ahead.  The  EC  has  made  it clear that 
- 7  -Member  States  should  apply the  principle  having  set  it out  in  several 
regulations;  for  example,  in  the  preamble  to  the  regulation establishing 
the  ERDF  it states that:  "The  Fund's  assistance  should  not  lead  Member 
States  to  reduce  their  own  regional  development  efforts  but  should 
complement  those efforts." 
9.  It would  appear at iirst sight  that  the  concept  of  additionality is a 
well-defined  and  regulated  subject.  Unfortunately  Article  36  of  the 
current  ERDF  regulation  continues  to  permit  the practice whereby  ERDF 
assistance  may  remain  in the  hands  of  the public  authorities  as  a  partial 
reimbursement  of their  aid  to  investment  (interpreted  by  the  Commission 
as  aid to  industry and  services,  but  in  practice applicable  also  to 
infrastructure projects); this  loophole  has  allowed  what  should  be  a 
clear  commitment  on  the  part  of  Member  States  and  the  Community  to  leak 
away  into a  nebulous  and  doubtful  agreement  in principle. 
- The  Principle  of  Additionality in  Practice 
10.  The  principle of  additionality appears  to  be  a  very  simple  concept  i.e. 
EC  monies  are  simply to be  added  to  the  amount  of  national  expenditure  in 
favour  of  the  same  sector  for  which  the  money  is given.  However,  in 
practice,  additionatity  is  both  a  sensitive  matter  at  a  political  Level, 
as  well  as  being  a  complex  subject  at  a  technical  level.  The  particular 
problems  that  arise  are  listed below. 
a)  "Global" or  "individual" 
11.  Additionality  can  be  applied  at  two  levels: 
- Global  Additionality:  ERDF  reimbursements  are  added  to  the  expenditure 
allocated generally  for  regional  development; 
Individual  Additionality:  ERDF  aid  for  a  project  is  added  to  the 
national  aid given  for  a  particular proj'ect. 
- 8  -12.  The  Member  States  have  been  able  to  decide  freely  which  of  these  two 
forms  they will  pursue,  and  in  most  cases  they  have  opted  for  "Global 
Additionality."  The  EC  funds  are  usually  received  by  central government 
,rather  than  directly by  the  investor.  This  makes  it much  harder  to 
decide  if additionality is actually being  applied  and,  in  fact,  in its 
Annual  Report  of  the  Court  of  Auditors  for  19845  the  court  expressed  the 
view  that  Global  Additionality  was  being  applied  in  a  less  than 
satisfactory manner. 
13.  ·AL~hough it is  perhaps  the  only  means  for  ensuring  that  extra  projects  do 
result  from  ERDF  financing,  the  concept  of  "Individual  Additionality" 
meets  fundamental  difficulties:  Fund  aid  for  projects  is granted  only on 
applications  sent  to Brussels  by  national  Governments  (Art.  22),  fund  aid 
·can  never  exceed  55%  of  the total public  expenditure  involved  in 
programmes  or  individual  projects  (Arts.  7,  11,  20)  and  projects must  be 
part  of  a  regional  development  programme  CArt.  17.2).  The  practical 
result  of  these  requirements  is  that  for  all projects  public  finance  from 
national  resources  must  be  assured  before  applications  are  sent  to 
Brussels.  In  very  few  cases  will  individual  projects  be  cancelled 
because  of  a  decision  not  to  afford  ERDF  support. 
14.  Furthermore,  since  individual  additionality  implies  that  more  individual 
projects  can  be  undertaken,  such  projects  would  normally  be  lower  on  a 
list of  national  priorities and  implicitly  likely to  produce  a  Lower  rate 
of  return.  In  fact  national  governments  tend  to  send  applications  to 
Brussels  for  projects  high  on  their lists of  priorities to  be  sure of 
obtaining  ERDF  support.  This  means  that  the  link  between  ERDF  support 
and  particular projects  tends  to  be  artificial and  tenuous.  Insofar as 
ERDF  aid  does  result  in  resources  being  available  for  certain  specific 
extra projects,  these  would  tend  to  be  border-line  cases  which  national 
authorities  might  not  otherwise  have  supported  with  public  funds 
<although  it should  be  remembered  that  ERDF  criteria are  not  necessarily 
the  same  as  national  criteria  and  that  low  priority on  a  national  list 
would  not  therefore necessarily mean  Low  priority for  the  Community  as  a 
whole). 
~  ~J t  326/1985.  Quoted  on  page  5 
- 9  -15.  It has  also been  suggested  that  the  individual  form  of  additionality 
could  lead to an  unmanageable  amount  of  extra  bureaucracy.  There  is 
already a  Long  delay  that  is  unavoidable  in  the  procedure  for  first 
approving  projects  and  then  according  grant  payments  in  line  with 
progress  in  implementation.  Efforts  to  ensure  that  Community  funds  were 
separated  from  national  aid  for  individual  projects  could  result  in great 
problems  of  coordination  and  if this  separation  were  to  require greater 
supervision  by  the  Commission  of  the  recipients  of  its grants  then it 
would  be  unable  to meet  this obligation with  present  levels of  staffing. 
b)  Other  problems 
16.  While  Article  43  of  the  Fund  Regulation  requires  Member  States to ensure 
that  amounts  received  from  the  ERDF  are  clearly  identified in  their 
budget  systems,  Member  States  also  tend  to  include  projected  EC  income  in 
their overall  spending  plans;  it is  argued  that  the  extra  income  from  the 
European  Community  has  allowed  public  spending  on  regional  policy to  be 
kept  at  a  higher  level  than  would  otherwise  have  been  possible,  but  this 
practice  makes  it more  difficult  to  determine  if the  additionality 
principle is  being  applied  and  especially so  in  periods  of  rapid 
inflation. 
17.  Even  where  EC  aid  is  clearly  seen  to  be  additional,  by  allowing  an 
increase  in  spending  on  regional  policy  in  one  particular  Member  State  in 
relation to the  level  prevailing  in earlier years,  this  may  be  only  a 
temporary  phenomenon:  theoretically,  an  addition  to  the  funding  available 
in  a  given  year  may  be  offset  by  a  Member  State  by  the  simple  device  of  a 
corresponding  decrease  in  subsequent  years,  although  this  can  never  be 
shown  in practice. 
18.  The  pursuit  of  mathematical  additionality may  be  irrelevant  in addition 
to being  impossible  in  a  large  number  of  areas,  since  ERDF  spending  can 
have  an  important  qualitative  impact  and  introduce  new  concepts  to the 
process  of  regional  development.  This  concept  is  described  in  French  as 
"compl~mentarit~" and  is distinguished  in that  language  from 
"additionalit~". 
- 10  -19.  There  is no  sure  way  of  knowing  what  the  national  level  of  commitment 
would  have  been  in  the  absence  of  EC  funds;  it is not  possible  to  know 
for  a  particular project  failing  to  attract  ERDF  support  whether: 
(a)  the  government  would  have  made  up  all of  the difference; or 
(b)  the  government  would  have  made  up  some  of  the  difference;  or 
(c)  the  government  would  have  cancelled  the  project  as  no  EC  funds  were 
forthcoming. 
The  level  of  expenditure  that  would  prevail  in the  absence  of  increased 
EC  funding  is  completely  hypothetical  in practice. 
20.  In  some  circumstances  the  application of  individual  additionality would 
mean  running  the  risk of  public  aid  to  industrial  projects  exceeding  the 
Community's  own  ceilings  through  the  accumulation  of  national  and  EC 
monies.  Governments  will  normally offer  just  sufficient  assistance to  a 
potential  industrial  investor  to  ensure  that  a  project  goes  ahead. 
Adding  ERDF  aid  on  top  would  be  both  wasteful  and  possibly against  the 
rules,  if too  great  a  proportion  of  the total  investment  came  from 
"public• sources.  Inevitably this  problem  contributes  to  the  excessive 
dominance  of  infrastructure  in  the  applications  submitted  by  most  Member 
States. 
21.  EC  expenditure  must  be  financed  from  EC  resources;  discussion of 
additionality tends  to  ignore  the  negative  impact  on  all  regions 
resulting  from  the taxation  needed  to pay  for  Community  expenditure. 
Although  the  tax  contribution  of  less-favoured  regions  is  not 
proportionate to their population  and  forms  only  a  small  part of the aid 
from  the  Fund  which  they  receive,  they would  nevertheless  suffer adverse 
effects both directly from  this share  of  the  increased  taxation necessary 
to pay  for  increased  regional  spending  and  indirectly  from  reduced  demand 
for  products  of  the  less-favoured  regions  resulting  from  lower  disposable 
income  elsewhere  in  the  Community. 
- 11  -- Counter-measures 
22.  The  reader  should  now  be  aware  of  some  of  the  complexities  involved.  No 
easy solutions  are  available  to  the  problem  of  ensuring  additionality. 
The  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  has  seen  a  partial solution  in 
the greater  degree  of  control  and  influence  afforded  by  programmes;  in 
its reply to the observations  of  the  Court  of  Auditors  report  for  1984 
the  Commission  stated: 
"The  Commission  shares the  Court  of  Auditors'  concern  that  the  ERDF 
may  not  have  produced  a  real  increase  in  Member  States'  own  regional 
development  efforts.  The  shift  from  a  project  financing  system to 
programme  co-financing  system  should  help  to  increase  complementarity 
and  make  it more  obvious.  However,  it is  clearly  impossible  to  make  a 
mathematical  check  on  global  additionality  since  this  would 
necessarily involve  comparing  actual  regional  expenditure  by  the 
Member  State with  what  it would  have  spent  if the  ERDF  did  not  exist. 
The  Court  of  Auditors  itself admits  that  global  additionality is 
difficult  to  verify.  The  Commission  is  prepared  to  consider  any  ideas 
the  Court  of  Auditors  may  have  as  to  a  method  for  verifying global 
additionatity."6 
23.  The  remarks  made  by  the  Commission  do  not  take  us  very  far  but  are  a 
salutary  reminder  of  tne  caution  with  which  the  whole  subject  has  to be 
approached.  It could  never  be  a  productive  exercise  to  attempt  to 
measure  the  adherence  to  the  principle  of  additionality by  each  Member 
State.  On  the other  hand,  a  further  factor  pushing  the  Member  States  in 
this direction  lies  in  another  innovation  introduced  with  the  ERDF 
regulation of  1984  <see  page  (4))  which  involved  the  replacement  of  fixed 
national  quotas  by  indicative  ranges  for  the  share  of  each  Member  State 
in the  Fund's  resources  over  a  three-year period.  This  makes  it more 
difficult for  national  governments  to  include  the  projected  income  from 
the  ERDF  in their national  budgets  and  thereby  treat  it as  a  financial 
transfer to which  they  are  entitled.  The  possibility of  obtaining 
considerably more  than  a  State's minimum  entitlement  (i.e. the  lower 
6  Court  of  Auditors  Annual  Report  for  1984;  Commission  replies,  OJ  C 326/85, 
p.  190 
- 12  -percentage  of  the  indicative  range)  is also  a  welcome  incentive to 
national  governments  to  present  more  and  better applications  than  would 
have  been  strictly necessary  in  order  to  achieve  their quota  in  the past. 
24.  Nevertheless,  it has  been  observed  recently  that  Community  aid  should  be 
additional  to  national  government  expenditure,  in  the  sense  of  allowing 
new  or expanded  projects to  go  ahead  that  would  not  otherwise  be 
possible.7  Unfortunately,  no  way  of  ob~iging them  to  do  so  has  yet  been 
discovered  and  in  this  lies the  paradox  of  the additionality principle; 
it is  in  general  felt  that  additionality is  not  being  applied  and  yet 
there is no  cast-iron method  that  exists  to  prove  that  it is not  being 
applied.  In  some  cases  it may  well  be  that  the  granting  of  ERDF 
assistance  for  a  specific  project  to  a  major  investor,  such  as  a  national 
gas  distribution  agency,  will  release  national  resources  for  lower 
priority projects.  Reliance  on  such  a  procedure  would  leave  the question 
of  additionality entirely outside  the  control  of  the  Community's 
institutions.  Furthermore,  if the  true  impact  of  Community  aid  is 
indirect -via the facilitation  of  projects  with  a  lower  economic  rate  of 
return- then  it is not  obvious  that  this  is  a  desirable  consequence, 
whether  for  the  Community  as  a  whole  or  for  the  Member  State  concerned. 
Insofar  as  commercially  unjustifiable projects  are  thereby  allowed  to 
proceed,  ERDF  grants  will  be  contributing  to  a  waste  of  both  Community 
and  national  resources. 
25.  The  recent  shift  to  a  programme  co-financing  system  under  the  revised 
1984  ERDF  Regulation  may  help to  make  it more  obvious  if the principle is 
or  is not  being  applied  but  the  1984  reforms  may  not  be  as  helpful  in 
this  respect  as  was  at  first  hoped.  It  has  been  argued  that  both  the 
previous  "Quota  system",  and  the  new  one  are  unsatisfactory,  due  to  the 
large  degree  of  control  over  the  allocation  of  national  shares  that  the 
Member  States  retain.8  Even  some  Commission  officials believe  that  the 
emphasis  on  programmes  will  lead  to  a  reduction  in  the  control  of the 
Commission  over  spending  on  specific  projects.  Much  will  depend  on  the 
reports  to be  submitted  regularly  by  the  Member  States  concerned. 
7  ERDF:  An  Overview  of  the  1984  Review  with  Particular  Emphasis  on 
Infrastructure Projects,  Planning  Exchange,  Glasgow 
8  H W Armstrong,  "The  Reform  of  the  European  Community  Regional  Policy", 
Journal  of  Common  Market  Studies,  Volume  XXIII,  No  4,  June  1985 
- 13  -26.  Greater  control  for  the  Commission  in  allocation of  the  ERDF  between 
Member  States  would  have  helped  to  reduce  the  additionality problem. 
This  was  rejected by  the  Council  because  of  the  transfer of  power  to the 
Commission  involved  and  the  role  of  "Community  programmes"  in  the  new 
regulation  as  envisaged  by  the  Commission  was  much  reduced. 
Nevertheless,  Article  6  of  the  ERDF  regulation  does  specify that  Member 
States  shall  submit  an  appropriate  number  of  applications  in  the  form  of 
programmes,  so  that  the  Commission  "may  as  far  as  possible guarantee  that 
the  share  of  ERDF  aid  allocated to programme  financing,  including 
Community  programmes,  is gradually  increased  to  reach  at  least  20%  of  the 
appropriations  allocated by  the  ERDF  at  the  end  of  the  third year" 
(1987). 
*  *  *  *  * 
The  purpose  of this  paper  is  to  make  an  inter-country comparison  of  how 
those  Member  States  which  have  a  major  interest  in  ERDF  spending,  and 
have  had  some  years  experience  in  combining  it with  national  expenditure, 
apply the principle of  additionality of  ERDF  resources  when  implementing 
their  regional  policy  (particularly as  regards  infrastructure 
,onvestment>.9  S  l  l 
0  d 
0  d  t  h  th  orne  genera  cone  us1ons  are  rawn  1n  regar  o  ow  e 
situation  could  be  best  improved  so  as  to  ensure  a  more  generally-agreed 
application of this principle. 
9  Spain  and  Portugal  are therefore  excluded  from  the  scope  of  the  paper, 
together  with  Belgium,  Denmark,  Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands,  all of 
whom  receive  less  than  1X  of  ERDF  resources 
- 14  -The  European  ParL;a•ent  and  Additionality 
27.  The  Parliament's  Committee  on  Regional  Policy  and  Regional  Planning  has 
examined  the problem  of  additionality and  the  ERDF  on  many  occasions  in 
its reports.  The  last  of  these  was  adopted  in  the  context  of  the 
revision of  the 1975  regulation  ~n the  fund10  but  this  succeeded  an 
earlier report  on  the  same  subject.11 
28.  The  rapporteur  for  both  reports  was  Mr  DE  PASQUALE,  who  has  been 
Pres;dent ~  the  Committee  since  1979.  In  his  second  report,  adopted  by 
the  Committee  on  21  March  1984,  Mr  DE  PASQUALE  proposed  a  new  article12 
in  t:ne  fund  regulation  which  would  have  read  as  follows: 
'"The  Fund
1 s  contribution  •••  must  be  in addition to  the  aid  granted 
by  the  national  public  authorities,  subject  to  the  rules  of 
competition.  In  any  case  the  financial  contribution of  the  Member 
·state in the  areas  concerned  must  be  increased  by  the  amount  of the 
Community  contribution." 
29.  The  report,  including this  amendment,  was  adopted  in  plenary on  13  April 
1986,  but, together  with  many  other  amendments  proposed  by  Parliament, 
this  proposal  was  rejected  by  the  Council.  In  regard  to  programmes,  a 
Parliament  amendment  requiring  for  Community  programmes  that  there  should 
be ;·ncluded  in the  latter financial  estimates  "making  it clear that  the 
Fund's  contribution  represents  an  overall  additional  financial  effort to 
assist  ~he regions  and  areas  affected  by  the  programmes"  was  similarly 
also  rejected.  Even  the  Commission's  original  draft  regulation,  which 
referred  in the  context  of  "national  programmes  of  Community  interest" to 
the  inclusion  of  a  forward  financing  plan  "highlighting the fact  that 
Fund  assistance  takes  the  form  of  an  overall  supplementary  financial 
contribution  in favour  of  the  regions  or  areas  concerned"  was  changed  by 
1:he  Council ·to  omit  any  reference  to  a  "supplementary" effort  (Article 
12(e)  of the  regulation  now  refers  only to "the various  sources  of 
nat;onal  and  Community  finance"). 
----------------------- 10  Doc  1-86/84  A  +  8 
11  Doc  1-61/82  A +  B 
12 Propt$:al for TM!.w  article 35a 
- 15  -30.  Although  on  the question  of  additionality the  Council  gave  no 
satisfaction to the Parliament  in  the  text  of  the  regulation,  the 
conciliation meeting  held  on  19  June  1984  (the  same  day  as  that  on  which 
the  Council  adopted  its  regulation>  did  result  in  a  joint  statement  which 
refers to the  matter.  The  Council,  Commission  and  Parliament  stated at 
the end  of  this short  document  that: 
•As  a  rule,  ERnf  aid  constitutes  an  additional  global  source  of 
financing  to promote  the  development  of  the  beneficiary  regions  or 
areas.•13 
31.  More  recently,  in its resolution  on  the  Tenth  Annual  Report  on  the 
activities  of the  ERDF,  based  on  a  report  by  Mr  MUSSO  for  the  Committee 
R  .  l  P  t•  d  R  .  l  Pl  .  14  h  P  l.  t  (  .  16  f  on  eg1ona  o  1cy  an  eg1ona  ann1ng,  t  e  ar  1amen  po1nt  o 
the  resolution): 
"Recognises  that  the  availability of  ERDF  aid  will  in  many  cases  have 
made  it possible to  finance  schemes  that  could  not  otherwise  have  gone 
ahead,  even  where  the  share  of  ERDF  money  is  relatively  low;  concludes 
that  the  influence  of  the  ERDF  on  the  economy  of  the  regions  is far 
greater than  its allocation of  appropriations  alone  would  suggest; 
hopes  that,  with  the  application  of  the  new  ERDF  Regulation  (No. 
1787/84),  the  Commission  will  be  able  to evaluate  and  publicise this 
influence; notes  further  that  the  conditions  which  the  Community 
attaches to the  grant  of  ERDF  aid  have  a  significant  influence  on  the 
shape  of  the  regional  policy of  the  Member  States  but  that  this 
influence  would  be  greater  and  more  effective  if the  principle of 
additionality were  fully  implemented;" 
and  Later  on  in  the  same  resolution  (point  25),  the  Parliament: 
"Notes  that, while  the  report  contains  much  statistical  information  on 
the first ten years  of  operation  of  the  Regional  Fund,  it is  short  on 
qualitative  assessments  of  this  period;  believes  that  in  implementing 
the  new  Regulation the  Commission  must  place greater  emphasis  on 
ensuring that  Community  expenditure  is genuinely  additional  to 
13  PE  90.520, not  published  in  the  OJ 
14  EP  Resolution  of 8  September  1986;  Doc  A2-76/86 
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effort  should  be  made  to  finance  new  projects  and  not,  as  is too  often 
the  case,  projects  that  are  close  to  completion  or  even  completed." 
Commissioner  PFEIFFER  stated  in  the  debate  on  this  report  that  the  points 
of  view  expressed  in  the  resolution  were  shared  by  the  Commission,  in 
particular with  regard  to  the  problem  of  additionality. 
32.  On  30  January 1987,  the  Committee  on  Regional  Policy  and  Regional 
Ptanning heard a  statement  by  Mr  MIDDELHOEK,  Member  of  the  Court  of 
Auditors  responsible  for  regional  policy.  This  was  the first  occasion  on 
which  a  direct  exchange  of  views  was  held  with  the  Court  of  Auditors. 
Additionality  was  a  major  theme  of  Mr  Middelhoek's  speech  and  of the 
response  of  Dr  SOLIMA,  Director  of  Development  Operations  at  DG  XVI 
(Regional  Policy)  of  the  European  Commission.  The  essence  of the 
discussion  is  taken  up  at  various  points  in  this  study,  but  Mr  Middelhoek 
was  notably critical of  the  Commission  for  its  luck  of  persuasiveness  in 
bringing the  Member  States  to  treat  additionality more  seriously and  of 
the  Member  States  themselves,  whose  defence  of their policies  in this 
regard  were,  as  he  put  it, "short  on  substance". 
33.  The  Members  of  the  European  Parliament  have  also  put  various 
parliamentary questions  to the  Council  and  Commission  on  the  subject  of 
additionatity and  the  ERDF.  The  latest  of  these15  was  put  down  by 
Mr  NEWMAN  and  evoked  the  response  from  the  Council  that  the  present 
legislation on  the  ERDF  provided  for  grants  to  remain  in  the  hands  of 
public  authorities  as  partial  reimbursement  for  aid  granted  by  them  and 
that  the  Council  had  received  no  proposal  from  the  Commission  to  review 
existing  arrangements. 
15  H-176/86,  answered  by  Mrs  CHALKER,  President  in  Office  of  the  Council,  on 
7  October  1986.  Earlier questions  include  those  of  Mrs  EWING  (H-218/79) 
to the  Commission  CEP  Debates  No.  248,  p.  230),  of  Mrs  QUIN  <H-294/80)  to 
the  Co~cil (EP  Debates  No.  260,  p.  168),  of  Mr  GERONIMI  (Written  Question 
No.  2198/83)  to the  Council  COJ  C 152/84,  p.  29)  and  of  Mr 
VANDEMEULEBROUCKE  (Written  Questions  No  2092/84  and  2727/85)  to  the 
Commission  (OJ  C 214/85,  p.  10  and  C 314/86,  p.  7) 
- 17  -The  Situation in Certain  Countries of the  EC 
England  and  Wales 
34.  It is not  possible to describe  the  working  of  local  government  in the 
United  Kingdom  as  a  whole,  since  there  are  differences  in  the  structure 
and  decision-making  framework  between  England  and  Wales,  Scotland  and 
Northern  Ireland. 
3~.  In  England  and  Wales  EC  affairs are  handled  by  UK  Central  Government 
departments.  In  the  context  of  the  ERDF,  infrastructure projets are  the 
responsibility of  the  Department  of  the  Environment  (in  Wales  the  Welsh 
office),  while  industrial  projects  are  the  responsibility of  the 
Department  of  Trade  and  Industry.  The  latter  department  however  takes 
the  lead  on  regional  policy  as  a  whole,  which  is  conceived  in the  United 
Kingdom  principally as  "Regional  Industrial  Policy"  and  not  as  the 
correction  of  weaknesses  in  regional  infrastructure. 
36.  England  and  Wales  contain  53  large  county  authorities,  within  which  there 
are 369  smaller  district  authorities.  County  Councils  are  responsible 
for  matters  involving  planning over  a  wide  area,  or  which  require  a  large 
amount  of  resources.  District  Councils  tend  to  have  control  of  functions 
which  have  a  more  local  significance e.g.  housing  and  refuse  collection. 
37.  Applications  to  the  ERDF  concerning  infrastructure projects  and  the grant 
claims  that  follow  them  are  coordinated  by  the  Department  of the 
Environment's  (DOE)  regional  offices  or  by  the  Welsh  Office.  These 
regional  offices  liaise with  local  authorities  and  other  regional  bodies 
and  then  pass  on  applications  for  infrastructure projects  under  the  ERDF 
to London.  The  Regional  Policy  Division at  the  main  DOE  office  then 
prepares  grouped  applications  for  Brussels,  and  projects  are  submitted 
four  times  a  year  on  a  regional  group  basis.  Small  projects  are  grouped 
together on  a  geographical  basis  and  presented  in  a  global  form,  whereas 
bigger projects  are  put  in separately and  may  be  submitted  at  any  time. 
As  required by  the  ERDF  regulation,  grants  are  made  against  actual 
payments  and  not  for  expenditure  which  may  be  undertaken  in  the  future. 
- 18  -38.  In  regard  to  local  authority  finance,  current  expenditure  is financed 
from  a  combination  of  central  government  grants  (mainly  Rate  Support 
Grant)  and  local  rates  <basically a  tax  on  land  and  buildings),  while 
capital  expenditure  is  in  the  main  financed  by  borrowing,  but  with  part 
coming  from  grants  and  other  income. 
39.  ERDF  finance  is  limited  to capital  investment  schemes  which  are fully 
committed  and  already  started, or  on  which  expenditure will  be  incurred 
in the  same  year  as  the  application.  Local  authorities  therefore  use 
ERDF  funds  received  to  reduce  the  amount  that  they  need  to borrow  to 
finance  existing projects,  with  the  result  that  interest  charges  and  debt 
service  costs  <which  would  otherwise  have  to  be  paid)  are  reduced. 
However,  in  many  cases  this  may  be  too  complicated  to  make  the 
preparation  of  applications  for  ERDF  funds  a  cost-effective exercise  for 
Local  authorities. 
40.  Payment  of  ERDF  grants  is effected  by  transfer  from  Brussels  to the 
United  Kingdom  Central  Government,  which  then  distributes  the  funds  to 
the  relevant  local  authorities.  Grants  received  from  the  ERDF  are 
deducted  from  each  authority's  capital  allocation  from  the  central 
government.  In  general,  ERDF  grant  support  is not  taken  into account  for 
forward  planning  purposes  and  as  such  does  not  influence  the  location, 
level  or  type  of  projects  undertaken. 
41.  The  fact  that  it is  central  rather  than  local  government  which  directly 
receives  the  funds  from  Brussels  gives  rise to  a  certain amount  of 
controversy  concerning the  additional  nature  of  the  funds,  since  the  net 
impact  of  an  ERDF  contribution on  investment  in the  region  concerned  will 
be  nil if central  government  treats  the  monies  obtained  from  the  ERDF  as 
a  replacement  for  national  public  expenditure. 
42.  There  is  disagreement  concerning  the  real  level  of  EC  funds  received  by 
the  central  government  that  is  passed  on  (i.e. net  of  the national 
contribution)  and  this  has  led  to  calls  being  made  for  increased  local 
government  involvement  in  both  representations  to  the  EC  and  the  receipt 
of  EC  monies. 
- 19  -43.  In  regard to "programmes",  both  British  local  authorities  and  the 
Commission  have  encouraged  the  emergence  of  a  "programme  approach"  as  a 
means  of moving  towards  genuine  additionality in  ERDF-supported  projects. 
In  the early 1980s,  the British  Government  had  been  opposed  to the 
involvement  of  local  authorities  in  the preparation of the first 
"non-quota  programmes"  <which  are  now  known  as  "Community  programmes") 
and  had  strongly  resisted attempts  to  make  the  expenditure  involved 
"additional".  Although  the  importance  of  these  Community  programmes  in 
the  new  ERDF  regulation  is not  as  great  as  was  intended  by  the 
Commission,  the  British  Government  has  taken  the  lead  in  presenting 
"national  programmes"  and  even  organised  a  seminar  for  government 
representatives  from  other  Member  States on  this  subject  during  1986. 
44.  In  regard  to  aid  for  industrial  projects,  the  UK  Government  continues  to 
argue  that  ERDF  grants  are  additional  because  they  allow  the  level  of 
regional  industrial  support  afforded  by  Member  States to  be  maintained 
<if  not  increased),  but  admits  that  receipts  for  such  projects are  used 
to provide partial  reimbursement  of  aid  already  paid  by  the  UK. 
Similarly,  for  infrastructure projects,  the  government  admits  to a  recent 
cut  in national  resources  made  available for  regional  policy but  implies 
that  the  reductions  would  have  been  even  greater  without  the  ERDF.  In 
the  House  of  Commons  on  8  May  1984  the  Minister  of  State at  the 
Department  of  Trade  and  Industry  stated that  "the  (British)  Government 
take  into  account  the  expected  Community  contribution  in  determining 
their  level  of  expenditure  on  various  programmes,  and  expenditure 
ceilings  are  higher  as  a  consequence  than  they  would  otherwise be."  This 
is, of  course,  not  verifiable  and  the  British  Government  has  always 
treated grants  from  the  ERDF  as  part  of  domestic  public  expenditure  and 
therefore applied  corresponding  reductions  to allocations  for  capital 
spending  on  infrastructure  of  local  authorities that  receive  such  grants. 
45.  The  Minister  admitted  on  the  occasion  of  this  recent  debate  in  the  House 
of  Commons  that  applications  were  made  for  projects that  would  probably 
go  ahead  even  if the  ERDF  grant  was  refused,  but  he  ascribed this to 
pressure from  the  Commission  on  Member  States to  submit  applications  for 
concrete projects "that  are  almost  certain to  go  ahead."  He  went  on  to 
say that  "Planning  for  projects  has  to be  done  well  before it is  known 
- 20  -what  ERDF  aid  will  be  available,  so  ERDF  receipts  passed  on  to  local  and 
·public  authorities  hav~ already been  taken  into  account  in the  overall 
level  of  expenditure." 
46.  The  attitude of  the present British Government  in  regard  to its refusal 
to  allow  local  authorities to  increase  capital  spending  when  ERDF  grants 
are  allocat~d was  shared  by  its predecessor.  In  the  answer  to  Mr 
NEWMAN's  question  given  in  the  European  Parliament  on  7  October  1986  and 
referred to on  page  16,  the  President  in  Office  of the  Council  quoted  the 
'Minister ·of  State at the Department  of  Industry  in  1977  to this effect.16 
4(.  Finally, it is  perhaps  worth  observing that  control  of  public  expenditure 
in general  in the  United  Kingdom  has  been  particularly strict for  many 
years.  Both  as  a  matter  of poticy  and  necessity  UK  governments  have 
sought to restrain the  growth  of  public  spending  by  local  authorities as 
well  as  central  government.  The  strict  limits on  capital  spending  for 
infrastructure  improvement  undertaken  by  local  authorities,  which  in 
other  respects  maintain  a  high  degree  of  autonomy,  have  no  real 
counterpart  in other  Member  States of  the  Community. 
1·6 -Hansa·rd,  '1"8  July 1·977.,  totumns  ,'Zt>S/9 
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48.  The  special status of  Northern  Ireland  within  the  United  Kingdom  and, 
especially,  the  existence  of  separate  accounts  for  this  region  should 
facilitate the  investigation of  the  additional  nature  of  ERDF 
contributions.  The  region  has  received  on  average  2.5%  of total  ERDF 
allocations  for  commitment  (about  300  million  ECU)  over  the  period  1975 
to 1984. 
49.  In 1984 a  major  share  of total financial  support  for  infrastructure 
projects  in the  province  was  provided  by  the  ERDF.  Responsibility  for 
these projects  rests with  the  Department  of  the  Environment  for  Northern 
Ireland.  Industrial projects  are  the  responsibility of the  Department  of 
Economic  Development  in  the  province. 
50.  Despite the existence  of  26  district  councils,  major  infrastructure such 
as  roads  and  water  supply  is  the  responsibility of  central government,  as 
is economic  planning.  Housing  and  health  are  administered  by  statutory, 
non-elected bodies.  The  high  degree  of  centralisation in government  and 
administration of  the  province  in  part  preceded  the  "direct  rule", 
instigated in 1972,  which  substantially curtailed  devolution  of all  such 
responsibilities to  local  bodies. 
51.  As  in mainland  Britain,  capital  spending on  projects  in  the  province  is 
controlled  from  London.  Applications  for  ERDF  grants  pass  through 
central 9overnment  ministries  and,  where  successful,  result  in grants 
being  passed  back  to  the  relevant  department  in  Northern  Ireland. 
However,  they  may  still be  regarded  as  a  partial  repayment  for  the  high 
level  of  national  support  given  to  Northern  Ireland,  since  corresponding 
reductions  in  capital  allocations  for  Northern  Ireland  authorities are 
made. 
52.  A report  published  in  198317  attempted  to quantify  the  amount  of  EC  funds 
disbursed  in  Northern  Ireland which  was  genuinely  additional  to financial 
support  from  other sources.  The  report  found  that  in  1981-2  about  one 
third  of  the  total  of  EC  funds  made  available  (£90  million)  directly 
substituted national  expenditure  and  that  the  other  two  thirds were  of 
17  Northern  Ireland  Economic  Council,  "Additionality of  EC  Funds",  March  1983 
- 22  -only  limited additionality:  no  off-setting change  in  nationally-financed 
expenditure  occurred  in  the  short  term,  but  over  a  longer  period the 
additional  nature  of  the  EC  funds  was  doubtful. 
53.  In  regard  to  the  integrated programme  for  Belfast,  the  Council  regulation 
on  urban  renewal  in this  city18  specifically provides  that: 
urhe  Uni~ed Kingdom  Gov~rnment shall also  provide  the  Commission  with 
all the  information it needs  to satisfy itself that  the  Community  aid 
is additional  to the total  volume  of  national  expenditure allocated to 
the  investment  projects  necessary  for  urban  renewal,  including the 
infrastructure projects  benefitting from  this  Community  aid.  The 
granting  of this  aid  shall  be  subject  to  a  finding  that  it is  indeed 
additional thereto." 
54.  The  UK  government  has  claimed  that  it is possible to  ensure  the 
·adcfi1:·i"''nat  nat·ure  of  the  Community's  contribution to  this  programme 
because  it can  reliably predict  the  level  of  EC  funds  over  future 
finan~ial years.  However  this  has  not  always  proved  to  be  the  case:  a 
large  number  of  planned  starts  in  the  house-building  programme  in  1983-4 
had  to be  cancelled because  EC  funds  were  not  forthcoming,  contrary to 
·t·he  government's  expectations,  following  the  failure  of  a  proposal 
concerning  a  special  ERDF  programme  for  housing  in Belfast  to be  adopted 
by  t-he  ·coun-ci t.  The  subsequently  approved  Council  Regulation  19  on  urban 
renewal  in the  city was  not  intended  to  support  housing.  The  minister 
concerned  stated that  as  a  result  of  the  Council  Regulation  higher 
expenditure  on  urban  renewal  in  Belfast  was  possible  but  this is not 
~vident from  a  comparison  of  expenditure  plans  issued  in  1981  with  the 
subsequent  outturn.  It  continues  to  appear  that  any  increase  in  EC 
spending  in  the  UK  is met  by  limits  on  the  funds  available  for  national 
expenditure  on  the  programme  concerned  or  related  programmes. 
55.  Nevertheless,  in the  report  to the  Council  in  1985  on  the application of 
·t·he  r-egulati-on  on  urban  renewal  in Belfast,  the  Commission  has  declared 
itself satisfied with  the  information  provided  by  the  UK  on  total 
expenditure  in  the financial  years  1983/4  and  1984/5  and,  in particular, 
with  the application of  the additionality  requirement. 
18  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1739/83  of  21  June  1983 
19  Com (:85).46'1  final, .2  October  1985 
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56.  The  republic  of  Ireland  is  an  exceptional  case  amongst  the  member  States 
of  the  European  Community  because  of  the  absence  of  any  "regionalisation" 
of  the  country,  at  least  for  purposes  of  economic  development  and  the 
ERDF.  The  entire  country  is treated  as  one  region  by  the  Commission,  on 
the grounds  that  its exceptionally  low  level  of  economic  development  in 
relation to other  Member  States  requires  the  whole  territory to be 
eligible for  ERDF  grants.  "Regional  policy"  is subordinate to a  national 
approach  in  Ireland and  economic  development  is  considered  primarily at 
the  national  level.  The  arguments  presented  by  the  Irish government  for 
maintaining this state of  affairs are  however  rather  weaker  now  that 
Greece  and  Portugal  are  also  members,  even  though  the  Irish population of 
3.5 million is substantially smaller  than  that  of  Portugal  or  Greece, 
since  in  these  countries  major  conurbations  are  excluded  from  the areas 
eligible for  ERDF  assistance  (Athens,  Thessalonica  and  Lisbon>. 
57.  The  absence  of  economic  regions  in  Ireland  renders  meaningless  any 
discussion of  additionality and  the  ERDF  in  terms  of  inter-regional 
transfers.  By  its  very  nature  the  transfer  of  ERDF  resources  to  Ireland 
is an  inter-governmental  transfer,  although  via  the  Community  budget.  It 
remains  reasonable  however  to  enquire  whether  these  transfers  have  made 
possible  an  increase  in  infrastructure development  and  industrial 
incentives.  To  this  question  the  answer  must  probably  be  yes,  since 
capital  expenditure  on  items  eligible for  ERDF  support,  such  as  roads, 
have  increased more  rapidly  since  the  ERDF  came  into operation  than  other 
types  of  capital  expenditure  but,  given  the  impossibility of  knowing  how 
public  expenditure  in this  and  other fields  would  have  developed  in 
Ireland in the  absence  of  ERDF  transfers, it is  impossible  to  show 
precisely to what  extent  these  have  made  possible  additional  spending  on 
regional  developments.  The  present  climate  of strict controls  on  public 
spending  increases  the  temptation  to  reduce  national  spending  in this 
field  more  than  elsewhere  because  in the  case  of  Ireland and  other 
relatively poor  Member  States  the  Community's  contribution already 
represents  a  substantial  share  of  the total public  resources  available20 
20  According  to  Joan  Hart  in  "Regions  in  the  European  Community",  ed.  Keating 
and  Jones,  1985,  this  share  amounted  to almost  11%  in  1983  for  those  items 
in the  Irish Public  Capital  Programme  eligible for  ERDF  support 
- 24  -and  a  small  decline  in the  national  contribution  is  therefore  less 
noticeable than  for  other  items  of  government  expenditure  where  the 
burden  is entirely borne  by  national  sources. 
58.  Since  Ireland treats  the  ERDF  as  a  source  of  finance  for  its national 
development,  it is understandable  that  the  Department  of  Finance  is the 
crucial organ  for  administration  of  the  ERDF  in  Ireland and  for  liaison 
with  the Commission.  The  Department  of  the  Environment  transmits to the 
Department  of  Finance  projects  eligible for  ERDF  assistance which  are 
executed  by  the  local  authorities.  Regional  Development  Organisations 
exist  in each  of  nine  physical  planning  regions  but  have  no  legal  status 
and  depend  on  loeal authorities and  central  government  for  the 
implementation  of  development  strategies for  the  regions.  Efforts  on  the 
part  of  these organisations  and  of  local  authorities to become  involved 
in  the  operation  of the  ERDF  have  failed,  because  of  opposition  from  the 
central  government  departments  and  because  no  coordinated  approach  by 
local  and  regional  organisations  in  Ireland  has  yet  been  achieved. 
59.  Tne  impac~ of  ~he sote non-quota  programme  - aid  for  border  areas  - in 
terms  of providing  additional  resources  for  projects  in  this  region  sadly 
remains  in  doubt.  Despite  the  increased  emphasis  in  the  new  ERDF 
regulation on  programmes,  it is not  yet  certain whether  they will  be 
applied effectively in  Ireland,  with  the full  involvement  of  regional  and 
local  organisations. 
- 25  -Ger.any 
60.  The  Federal  Republic  is the only  Member  State  with  experience of, as  its 
name  implies,  subnational  autonomous  regions:  the  Lander.  Under  the 
terms  of  the  Federal  Constitution there are  three  levels of  government 
with  clearly differentiated  responsibilities- national  (Bund),  regional 
(Lander)  and  communal.  However,  in  Germany  regional  policy is  viewed  by 
both  Federat  Government  and  the  Lander  as  being  a  joint  responsibility. 
A planning  committee  of  Federal  and  Lander  representatives draws  up  an 
annual  framework  of  projects  intended to  improve  regional  economic 
structures  and  establishes  rules  for  regional  policy coordination and 
harmonisation.  The  aim  of  regional  policy as  a  joint  undertaking  is to 
support  particular  regions  of  the  Federal  Republic  by  means  of  investment 
subsidies  financed  by  the  Federal  Government  and  the  Lander,  but  a  system 
of  inter-regional  financial  transfers  also  operates  to the benefit  of the 
poorer  Lander. 
61.  In  addition to these  resources  the  Lander  of  the  Federal  Republic  may 
obtain  finance  from  the  European  Regional  Development  Fund.  Since 
Germany  is a  relatively prosperous  Member  State  and  since eligibility for 
resource  allocation  from  the  Fund  depends  on  the  relative seriousness  of 
economic  underdevelopment  in  the  areas  or  regions  in  which  projects are 
carried out,  the financial  resources  available to  Germany  from  the  ERDF 
are  rather  small.  In  fact  the  regional  impact  within  Germany  of  CAP 
spending  is  considerably more  important  than  either the  ERDF  or  the 
Social  Fund. 
62.  Under  the  relevant  Community  regulation  the  allocation of  ERDF  funds  is 
governed  by  percentage  ranges;  the  range  for  the  Federal  Republic  is now 
2.55%  - 3.40%.  For  each  Member  State  the  lower  limit  of  the  range 
constitutes the  minimum  amount  of  ERDF.resources  it is guaranteed if it 
submits,  during the corresponding  period,  an  adequate  volume  of 
applications for  aid which  satisfy the  conditions  set  out  in  the 
Regulation. 
63.  The  Federal  Republic  receives  relatively few  grants  from  the  Fund  in 
comparison  with  most  other Member  States.  In  1983,  for  example, 
DM  48  million were  received  for  investment  to  improve  economic  structures 
(infrastructure  investment)  and  preserve  jobs  (industrial  infrastructure) 
- 26  -in  supported  regions  of  the  country.  In  contrast  to  the other  Member 
States,  in  the first  ten  years  of  Fund  operations  the  Federal  Republic 
used  more  than  half  of all  the  resources  allocated to it for  aid to 
1·ndustry. 
64.  ERDF  grants  are  paid  by  the  European  Community  directly to the  Federal 
Government,  which  then  passes  the  aid on  to  the  Lander.  The  regional 
tth;tribut·ion of  ERDF  aid  within  the  Federal  Republic  is not  uniform,  but 
varies  according to which  Lander  apply  and  from  year  to year. 
65.  Theoretically the  money  could  be  paid  directly to  the  Lander,  as  the 
states enjoy a  high  degree  of  financial  independence  within  the  Federal 
Republic  and  the  Federal  Government  is  not  entitled to examine  or 
~-c'Tuti·ni,ze  Land  budgets.  The  concept  of  additional  i ty is  perhaps 
therefore  more  applicable  at  the  Land  than  the  national  level  since the 
Federal  Government's  financial  contribution to  regional  incentives  is 
·only  a  part  o·f  the  resources  expended  for  this  purpose  and  implementation 
of the  incentives  policy is  frequently  carried out  by  the  Lander.  It 
should  be  noted  that  different  Lander  tend  to  apply  their  regional 
pol  i c·i es  in different  ways  and  therefore  also  to  use  ERDF  grants 
differently. 
66.  However,  insofar as  the  national  budget  is  concerned,  the  additional 
-natur-e  ·of :t:'R'Df  grants is  somewhat  conjectural  and  in  the  case  of the 
Federal  Republic  it is not  verifiable.  It is quite possible,  however, 
ttrat  ·at 'tne  global  levet  these  funds  from  the  ERDF  are  used  not  as 
additional  funds  but  rather as  a  means  of  recouping  expenditure  from  the 
~ederal  budge~.  The  federal  Republic  would  thus  support  regional  policy 
with  funds  from  its own  budget  and  uses  ERDF  funds  to  reduce  spending 
·from  its  budg~ by  replacing them.  The  money  thereby  saved  in  the 
federal  budget  can  be  used  again  in the  following  financial  year. 
67.  It must  be  repeated that  this  is  impossible,  or  at  least difficult, to 
veT1fy.  rn  ~h~ ~ase of the  Federal  Republic,  however,  the effects of 
such  a  procedure  would  not  be  unduly  serious,  since  the  funds  involved 
at:"C""unt for -only  about  3%  of all  ERDF  aid. 
- 27  -France 
68.  The  three different types  of  local  and  regional  structures are:  regions 
(22>,  "d~partements"  <160  including the  "d~partements d'outre mer">,  and 
communes  (36,934  in 1975>. 
69.  Capital  expenditure by  Local  authorities  in  France  is  financed  largely  by 
grants  from  central  government,  in particular the  "Dotation globale 
d'~quipement" established  in  1983.  However,  DATAR  <"D~l~gation i 
l'Am~nagement du  Territoire et  i  l'Action  R~gionale"> is  responsible  on 
the  French  mainland  for  the preparation  of  both  industrial  and 
infrastructure projects  that  are  the  subject  of  ERDF  applications. 21  In 
some  cases  the  French  national  contribution to  these projects will  be 
financed  by  the "Dotation  Globale  d'Equipement",  but  in  many  others 
national  agencies  such  as  SNCF  <railways)  or  EDF  (electricity)  are 
providing the "matching  funds"  for  projects  Located  in  the  regions  but 
forming  part  of  national  infrastructure networks.  In  regard  to 
industrial projects the national  counterpart  to  ERDF  contributions  is the 
"Prime  d'am~nagement du  territoire". 
70.  DATAR  consults the  regional  authorities on  projects  being  drawn  up  in 
their area  but  the  degree  of  influence  of  the  regional  authorities tends 
to  vary  according  to  the  relationship  between  Local  and  central  branches 
of  government  in  the  region  concerned.  DATAR  maintains  special  regional 
and  rural  branch  offices  in  the  "pr~fecture" of  the  d~partements but  in 
some  cases,  it is  claimed,  the  process  of  consultation  has  not  amounted 
to more  than  a  formality.  The  process  of  devolution  to  regional  councils 
should  lead  to a  greater  involvement  of  these  bodies  in  regional  planning 
in future.  In  any  case,  decisions  on  which  projects  to  submit  as  ERDF 
applications  are  taken  centrally, with  payments  being  made  directly by 
the Commission  to the national  treasury and  then  placed  on  the  account  of 
the public  agency  involved  as  reimbursement  for  expenditure  undertaken.22 
21  In  the  "d~partements d'outre  me~" this  role  is played  by  the  Secretary of 
State  for  the  D~partements et  Territoires  d'Outre  Mer 
22  According  to a  study  by  the  Conseil  Economique  et  Social,  these  payments 
are  not  distinguished  in  the general  budget  of  the  French  Republic  by 
destination and  no  breakdown  by  ministry is provided.  See  "L'Apport  du 
FEDER  au  d~veloppement des  r~gions  fran~aises", page  38  in  Journal 
Officiel  (France>  of  25  July  1984 
- 28  -71.  It  is  not  possible  in  these  circumstances  to estimate  the  extent  to which 
ERDF  resources  are additional  in  the  sense  of  allowing extra projects to 
go  ahead.  It  is not  even  possible  to  show  how  French  national 
e·xp·enditure  on  "regional  policy"  has  changed  since  1975  because  of the 
great  difficulty in  separating  infrastructure  investments  intended to 
promote  the  economic  development  of  less-favoured  regions  of  France  from 
other, "ordinary",  infrastructure projects.  The  introduction of 
programmes  is  however  leading  to a  more  intensive  process  of  consultation 
with  regional  and  local  authorities  and  to a  more  evident  role  for  the 
E~~f i~ the economic  development  of  the  regions  concerned.  The  non-quota 
measures  adopted  under  the  1973  ERDF  regulation  are  implemented  in  France 
on  the basis of  "co-financing" or  of  a  system  in  which  the  ERDF 
contribution  is distinct  and  on  the  same  plane  as  contributions  from  the 
french State.  A similar situation applies  to "Integrated  Development 
Operations•  such  as  the  Mediterranean  Programmes  and  will  do  so  in  future 
for  "Community  Programmes"  under  the  1984  regulation. 
- 29  -Italy 
72.  The  process  of  regionalisation  has  been  taken  much  further  in  Italy than 
in other Member  States,  with  the  exception  of  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany  and  Spain.  It is well  known  however  that  the  Italian  regional 
authorities have  sometimes  found  difficulty in  exercising the  functions 
supposedly devolved  to them  under  the  constitution and  that  membership  of 
~he Community  has  sometimes  tended to push  responsibility  back  up  to 
central government. 
73.  In  the field  of  regional  policy  Italian  regions  have  claimed  that  their 
control  over  ERDF  spending  in  the  regions  concerned  is  inadequate despite 
their competence  in  the field  of  economic  development.  As  in other 
Member  States, applications  are processed  centrally and  the  funds  are 
passed  from  the  Commission  to  central  government  before  being  passed  to 
the  regional  authority responsible.23  The  regional  authorities play a 
major  role  in the preparation  of  projects  but  it has  to be  remembered 
that  many  projects  supported  by  the  ERDF  are  outside  their purview 
because,  like  in  France,  they  are  the  responsibility of  national 
agencies,  for  example,  for  energy  matters. 
74.  Furthermore,  although  the  Cassa  del  Mezzogiorno  and  its successor  are 
responsible  only for  checking  the  compatibility of  projects  submitted 
with technical  criteria  (and  especially with  the  requirements  of  the  ERDF 
regulation),  a  further  step in the  procedure  in  Italy is the  intervention 
by  the  ~inistry responsible for  Special  Action  in  the  Mezzogiorno  which 
gives  a  political assessment  of  the  projects  and  selects  those  which  are 
to be  submitted  to  the  Commission  in  Brussels  on  the  basis of a  rough 
balance  between  the  regions  as  well  as  of  the  compatibility of  the 
projects with  nationat  and  regional  requirements  as  laid down  in  econo~ic 
development  plans. 
75.  In  regard  to receipts, it should  be  said  that  ERDF  support  and  even 
transfers  from  the  Cassa  del  Mezzogiorno  for  those  infrastructure 
projects that  are the direct  responsibility of  the  regions  represent  only 
a  relatively  small  proportion  of  the total  spending  on  infrastructure by 
the  regions  concerned,  which,  in  addition to  local  tax  revenue,  receive 
resources  directly  from  the  state budget  for  this  purpose,  as  do  Italian 
23  The  procedure  is established by  Law  748/75 
- 30  -regions  outside  the  Mezzogiorno.  It would  appear  that  funds  from  the 
Cassa  and  the  ERDF  are  genuinely  supplementary  in  relation to  "normal" 
infrastructure  spending,  but  it is  impossible  to  state this with 
certainty in particular with  regard  to  the projects  managed  by  national 
agencies. 
76.  It is  however  evident,  both  from  the budget  of  the  Cassa  del  Mezzogiorno 
and  irom those  of the  regions  concerned,  that  ERDF  resources  are 
identified separately in  regard  to  forecast  receipts.  No  attempt  is  made 
·to reduce -central  government  transfers to the  regions  pro  rata to  rising 
receipts  from  the  ERDF  but  it  remains  impossible  to  verify at  the global 
level  to what  extent  these  funds  replace  rather  than  supplement  national 
spending  on  the  development  of  the  Mezzogiorno. 
77.  It has  been  observed  that  in  Italy, as  in other  Member  States which  have 
suffered a  rapid  rate  of  inflation  in  recent  years,  the availability of 
ERDF  grants  has  made  possible the  completion  of  many  projects  which  would 
otherwise  have  been  halted  because  national  allocations  (calculated on 
~he ba~is of  ~osts foreseen>  were  insufficient.24  It  is  apparently also 
common  practice for  local  authorities  to  submit  applications  for  and  to 
start  several  projects  in  the  knowledge  that  the  funds  immediately 
available  are  inadequate  to  complete  all  of  them  but  in  the  expectation 
that  ERDF  funds  will  subsequently allow  completion. 
24  For  example,  by  Dr  Solima,  Director  at  DG  XVI  of the  Commission  before the 
£P
1s  t-ommitt·ee  on  Regional  Pol icy  and  Regional  Planning on  30  January  1987 
- 31  -Greece 
78.  Most  projects supported  by  the  ERDF  in  Greece  concern  infrastructure 
rather  than  industry,  given  the  large  disparity  in  basic  infrastructure 
between  the  regions  of  Greece  outside  Athens  and  most  of  the  rest  of  the 
Community. 
'79.  Greece  is  divided  into 9  regions  and  52  prefectures  (nomoi>,  but  the 
process  of  regionalisation  and  devolution  to  local  authorities  of 
responsibility  for  matters  such  as  regional  development  has  not  yet  gone 
very  far.25  Although  mayors  and  other  local  representatives  may  at 
present  be  consulted  on  economic  development  in their  region  through 
appointed  councils,  they  are  involved  only  indirectly in  the  preparation 
of applications for  assistance  from  the  ERDF,  and  the  local  authorities 
are not  usually  even  aware  of  the  degree of  support  to  local  projects 
being  provided  by  the  ERDF  in  relation to  the  finance  provided  by  central 
government.  Individual  projects  may  have  been  initially proposed  by  the 
nomarch  Cor  prefect)  in  cooperation  with  the  mayors  or  other  local 
representatives,  but  the  decision  on  whether  or  not  to  support  the 
project  is  taken  at  central  level  and  any  application  for  ERDF  support 
emanates  from  the  Ministry  of  the  National  Economy.  Receipts  from  the 
ERDF  go  straight  into the  central  government's  budget. 
80.  There  has,  nevertheless,  been  roughly  a  25%  increase  in  regional  spending 
on  infrastructure  since  Greece  became  a  member  of  the  European  Community 
and  this  can  clearly be  ascribed  to  ERDF  support.  Central  government 
assistance to projects  in  the  Greek  regions  amounts  to only  120%  of  the 
funds  received  from  the  ERDF. 
81.  Both  national  and  local  economic  planning  in  Greece  is the  responsibility 
of  the Ministry of  the  National  Economy,  which  is  supposed  to  draw  up  a 
5-year plan.  Such  a  plan  exists  but  remains  at  a  theoretical  level  with 
no  ERDF  applications yet  being  placed  in  the  context  of this  plan.  The 
preparations  of  the  plans  necessary  for  Greece  to  benefit  from  the 
Integrated Mediterranean  Programmes  is however  obliging the  Greek 
authorities to observe  ERDF  and  IMP  criteria strictly. 
25  A recent  law  (No.  1622/86  of  14  July  1986)  provides  for  elected assemblies 
for  each  prefecture.  When  these  come  into existence - perhaps  in 1987-
major  changes  can  be  expected  with  much  greater  local  involvement  in 
regional  planning 
- 32  -82.  The  main  theoretical beneficiary  regions  of  the  ERDF  since Greece's 
accession  in 1981 26  have  been,  for  infrastructure projects: 
West/Central  Macedonia  669  million  ECU 
Peloponnese  and  West  Mainland  Greece  238  million  ECU 
Eastern  continental  and  Islands  140  million  ECU 
Epirus  158  million  ECU 
Thessaly  115  million  ECU 
Crete  109  million  ECU. 
83.  However,  it should  be  noted  that  the  apparent  imbalance  in  favour  of 
Macedonia  is linked to certain hydro-electric projects.  It might  be 
argued that the benefits accruing  from  such  major  investments  go  more  to 
the  country as  a  whole  than  to the general  economic  development  of  the 
region  concerned. 
84.  The  Athens  and  Thessalonica  areas  are excluded  for  most  purposes  from  the 
list of  regions  benefiting from  the  fund.  The  question  therefore arises 
of  a  possible diversion of national  resources  to these  two  urban  areas, 
resources  which  might  otherwise  have  been  spent  in those  regions  of 
Greece  which  are benefiting from  the  ERDF.  However,  there  can  be  no  way 
of  checking  this and  the  position is  less grave  for  Greece  than other 
Member  States given  the  relatively small  size of  the "excluded"  areas, 
even  if some  of the  intended  regional  redistribution of  resources  within 
Greece  would  be  negated  by  such  a  diversion. 
85.  The  Integrated Mediterranean  Programmes  will  include the  regions  of 
Athens  and  Thessalonica  in their scope,  since an  Annex  to the  Regulation 
concerned27  provides that  the  whole  of  Greece  is eligible. 
26  Up  to and  including the .second  allocation of 1987 
·27  Council  Regulation  CEEt)  No.  2088/85  of  23  July 1985  in  OJ  L 197/85 
- 33 -Conclusions 
86.  The  problem  of wadditionality"  results  from  the  way  in  which  Community 
regional  policy was  conceived.  Thus,  the  continuing  high  degree  of 
control  exerted by  central governments  of  EC  Member  States over  the 
applications  submitted to the  ERDF  and  over  the  expenditure  of  the 
resources that  are  allocated  to them  as  a  result  is  bound  to  Lead  to 
accusations  of the  sort  referred  to  in the  introduction.  Although  no 
final solution can  be provided  within ~he present  legal  framework,  it is 
nevertheless  apparent  that the exercise  of  central  government  control  is 
pernicious  to  varying  extents to the  objective  of  reducing  economic 
disparities between  regions  of  the  European  Community. 
87.  few,  if any,  other  governments  go  to  the  Lengths  of  the  UK  Government 
which  makes  a  pro  rata deduction  from  national  allocations to 
infrastructure  spending  by  local  authorities  when  ERDF  grants  are  made.28 
However,  the  suspicion  remains  that all governments  receiving  funds  from 
Community  sources  for  regional  development  are  tempted  to make  reductions 
in the overall  level  of  national  spending  allocated  for  this  purpose. 
Such  a  reduction  would  mean  that  the  ERDF  is  not  contributing  in any 
direct  way  to  a  narrowing  of  differences  between  regions  or  to  the 
Community  aim  of  "convergence"  but  only to  a  transfer of  resources 
between  governments,  although  it  is true  that  the  size of this transfer 
is  linked  to  the  seriousness  of  regional  problems  in  the  recipient 
countries.  The  evidence  available  suggests  that  the  "replacement" of 
national  by  Community  spending  is  Least  evident,  for  the  countries 
studied,  in Italy and  Greece  and  most  likely  in  the  UK  and  France. 
However,  this  impression  may  also be  influenced  by  the  nature  of  national 
procedures  and  regulations  which  are  more  "transparent"  in  some  countries 
than  others.  In  Italy in particular  there  also  seems  to exist  a  risk 
that  the financing  of  major  projects  partly through  ERDF  grants  may 
result  in  the  release  of  national  funds  for  less  attractive,  and  possibly 
wasteful, projects,  as  is discussed  in  paragraph  24  above. 
88.  For  Member  States  which  already  possessed prior to 1975  <or  to their 
accession to the  Community)  a  national  regional  policy  involving major 
transfers  of  resources  between  regions,  probably  the  only  way  to ensure 
28  This  is officially described  in  the  UK  as  no  "increase"  in  the  level of 
capital  spending  permitted  to  each  Local  authority 
- 34  -that  Community  resources  add  to  rather  than  replace  national  ones  is to 
reduce  the  role  of  central  government  organs  to that  of  national  referee 
between  competing  regions  or  local  authorities  within  the  state 
concerned.  Even  this  role  is  not  an  essential  one:  both  the  checks  on 
compatibility of projects  submitted  by  local  authorities  with  regional, 
national  or  Community  plans  and  the "refereeing"  between  regions  can  be 
done  in Brussels.  At  all  costs  the  situation must  be  avoided  where  a 
particulat'  tegion  ot'  local  authority  see~  ·its  sha~··\;!'  ·in  national  r·esources 
reduced  when  it receives  an  ERDF  grant.  This  practice  removes  all 
;n~ent;ve from  ~he regiunat  or  local  authority to prepare  good 
applications.  More  importantly,  the  sending  and  processing of  ERDF 
applications  constitutes  a  useless  and  expensive  bureaucratic  exercise 
unless  there  is a  resultant  increase  in  public  spending  on  regional 
policy. 
89.  It may  however  be  argued  that  since  infrastructure  spending  by  local 
authorities  or  national  agencies  represents  such  a  major  share  of  state 
budgets,  central  government  is  obliged  to exercise  some  degree  of  control 
because  of ~he implications  for  macro-economic  policy.  Yet  this argument 
uoes  not  preclude  a  reduced  role  for  central  government  in  the  submission 
of  ERDF  applications  and  the  use  of  the  ERDF  funds,  since  a  major  share 
of  publ-ic  funds ;nvolved  in  any  particular project  will  continue  to  be 
controlled  at  a  national  level.  In  the  case  of  the  United  Kingdom  a 
-reduc~ion i·n  1:he  nationat  -ceit ing  on  capital  spending  by  local 
authorities  could  also be  used  to  compensate  for  the  loss  of  control  by 
-central  government  over  ~ne submission  of projects  by  local  authorities 
in eligible  regions  and  would  enable  the  system  of  specific  reductions  in 
t·heir  borrow;ng allo-cations  when  a  p·roject  or  programme  is approved  to  be 
abandoned. 
90.  A major  doubt  must  remain  about  the desirability of  financing  one 
category of  ERDF  project:  that  concerned  with  major  infrastructure works 
carried out  in  the  regions  by  national  agencies  (power,  water,  major 
·roads  and  so  on).  "Such  proj-ects  are  frequently  more  concerned  with 
national  than  local  development  and  the  ERDF  contribution  to  such  a 
-proj-ec·t  doe-s  ·not  always  cont·ribute to  a  narrowing  of  inter-regional 
disparities.  A hydroelectric  dam  or  a  major  gas  pipeline  is not  an 
appropriate  use  of  Community  resources  intended  for  "regional 
development"  even  if the  ERDF  contribution  releases  national  funds  for 
- 35  -other more  locally-oriented  infrastructure.  Even  in  cases  such  as,  for 
example,  the electrification of  rural  areas  in  which  the  density of 
consumers  would  not  warrant  heavy  investments  on  strictly commercial 
criteria, the  use  of  ERDF  funds  to  alleviate  the  burden  on  the  Member 
States  has  less  to  do  with  regional  economic  development  than  with 
equalisation of  opportunity  carried  out  on  socio-political  ~rounds just 
like,  for  example,  the  provision of  schools  and  hospitals,  items  which 
happen  to be  excluded  from  the  categories of  infrastructure which  may  be 
funded  by  the  ERDF  (Annex  to  the  Fund  Regulation).  This  financing  of 
spending  by  national  agencies  is  surely a  less  desirable  use  of  ERDF 
funds  than  productive  investments  in  local  infrastructure,  services  and 
industry which  come  under  the,  at  least partial, control  of  local  or 
regional  authorities,  and  which  can  serve  to  increase  the potential  for 
internally-generated  development. 
91.  Major  reform  can  probably not  be  achieved  until  Article  36  of  the  ERDF 
regulation  is  amended.  This  article provides  for  assistance  from  the 
ERDF,  either to  supplement  aid  granted  to  the  relevant  investment  by  the 
public  authorities  or  remain  in  the  hands  of  those  authorities  "as  a 
partial  reimbursement  of  such  aid".29  However,  until  such  time  as  the 
possibility of  "reimbursement''  is  abolished,  the  way  forward  would  seem 
to  lie in  favouring  projects that  result  from  a  high  degree  of 
collaboration between  local/regional  authority,  Member  State government 
and  the  Commission.  The  joint  financing  of  programmes  is  indeed  the 
ideal  way  of  achieving  such  a  collaboration and,  given  the  inevitable 
reliance  of  the  Commission  on  Member  States  for  checking  on  the  proper 
implementation  of  projects, this  is  probably  the  only  feasible  means  of 
ensuring that  Community  objectives  are  taken  into  account  when 
applications  are  submitted  and  in  advance  of  implementation of  the 
project  concerned.  By  allowing  the  Commission  some  degree  of  control 
over the  contents  of  "national  programmes  of  Community  interest" and  by 
ensuring that  the  ERDF  resources  are  being  used  for  specific objectives 
in coordination  with  national  resources,  the  new  ERDF  regulation should 
permit  some  advance  towards  the  goal  of  "additionality".  Although  this 
goal  may  never  be  achieved  in  the  sense  of  permitting  an  identification 
of  an  ERDF  impact  on  regional  development  distinct  from  that  of  national 
29  OJ  L 169  of  28.6.84,  p.  14.  This  article is  interpreted  by  the  Commission 
as  applying  solely to  aid  for  industry  and  services,  but  in  practice  the 
same  principle  is  applied  for  infrastructure projects 
- 36  -regional  policies, the  programme  approach  allows  the  ERDF  to  influence 
the  shape  of national  regional  spending  as  well  as  supplementing total 
national efforts. 
92.  The  Community  programmes  provide,  of  course,  for  an  even  greater degree 
of  control  by  the  Commission  and  therefore a  greater assurance of 
additionality.  It is in.fields such  as  the  STAR  and  VALOREN30 
·programmes,  on  the one  hand,  and  those  programmes  seeking to provide 
alternative sources  of  employment  by  such  means  as  improved  business 
servi~es ~o local enterprises, on  the other, that  the  cause  of 
"additionality" can  make  most  progress. 
93.  The  current  discussions  concerning  the  prov1s1ons  in the  Single  European 
:A~t ·for '"·cohesion•  and  the  Commission's  proposal  for  a  doubling  of  the 
resources  allocated to the structural  funds  give  further  importance  to 
the problem  of ensuring the effectiveness and  "additionality" of  ERDF 
grants.  It may  be  that  a  qualitative improvement  in the nature of 
regional policies as  applied  in each  Member  State and  a  net  transfer of 
resour~es between  governments  is the best  that  can  be  hoped  for  from  the 
Community's  regional  policy as  it stands.  However,  at  the  very  least 
further  efforts need  to be  made  to separate  ERDF  contributions to 
regional  development  from  that  of  national  budgets  and  to  keep  Community 
spending outside the  restraints  imposed  by  national  governments  to  limit 
~heir domestic  public expenditure.  Only  a  clear distinction between  the 
two  can  avoid  the  situation in which  Member  State governments  are  tempted 
~o ~ompensate for  national  cutbacks  by  using  ERDF  funds  to plug  the  gap. 
3D  t:omnri.s:s;·on  'Proposats for Council  Regulations  instituting Community 
Programmes  for  the development  of  certain  less-favoured  regions  by 
improving  access to advanced  telecommunications  services 
(STAR  ·- COM(85)836)  and  by  exploiting  indigenous  energy  potential 
CVALOREN- COM(85)838);  EP  Reports  - NEWMAN  (Doc  A2-60/86)  and 
GERONTOPOULOS  <A2-62/86)  for  the  Committee  on  Regional  Policy and  Regional 
:Planning  and  resoluti'Ons of 13  June  1986 
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